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Everyone has different motivations for working, . But the primary incentive for slogging it 
out in the corporate jungle would be money— at least that is what employers believe. This 
helps explain why companies are often willing to shell out wads of cash to outbid one another in 
the labour market for top executives. 
Yet, one country has shown that strong company profits can be achieved without having to pay 
top dollar. The CEOs of China’s state-owned enterprises (SEOs) are leading their companies to 
new heights despite being paid less than their counterparts in the private sector. 
The Ministry of Finance in China reported in March 2011 that profits from SOEs have reached 
331.65BRMB (52B USD) in the first two months of the year, up 29.4 per cent from the same 
period of 2010. 
It also said that the operating revenues of SOEs in January and February that year came to 5.14 
trillion RMB (815.5B USD), up 26.4 per cent. 
At the same time, the gulf between the salary of a CEO at a SOE and private enterprise remains 
wide. China’s highest paid CEO, Yang Yuanqing of Lenovo Group, received an annual salary of 
78.72M RMB (12.5M USD) last year. In contrast, the highest paid CEO at an SOE was Han 
Junliang, who was paid 8.58M RMB (1.4M USD) by Sinovel Wind Group. 
 
What motivates these CEOs when they do not stand to benefit substantially from their 
companies’ growth? 
According to Jerry Cao, an assistant professor of finance at the Lee Kong Chian School of 
Business, the driving force is the likelihood of a political career as the CEOs try to move up the 
rungs of the career ladder. Cao was co-author of the paper 'Political Promotion, CEO Incentives, 
and the Relationship between Pay and Performance'. 
It’s not all about the money 
China started the corporatisation and privatisation of its SOEs in 1978 when many decision rights 
associated with the operation of the firm, such as profit retention and profit-sharing schemes, 
were shifted from the state level to the firm level. 
But the state retained its control over personnel decision with the ultimate authority over the 
selection, appointment, and dismissal of SOE executives. It is also common practice for the 
ruling Communist Party to consider these executives in the selection and evaluation process for 
bureaucratic promotion. 
As the CEOs in these companies have limited outside job opportunities, a political appointment 
which brings with it higher salary and prestige, would make for an attractive career move. 
This means that besides carrying out their fiduciary duties, these CEOs are also concerned 
about assessments from government officials, which might allow them to climb the political 
ladder, said the researchers. 
From the start of the early 1980s, the Chinese central government has mandated that almost all 
bureaucrats at various levels should be familiar with capitalist ideas. The policy sends a signal to 
the CEOs that the government values economic performance, providing another reason for these 
executives to work towards raking in handsome company profits. 
And while the pay package of the CEOs at the SOEs is smaller, there has been a gradual 
introduction of a performance-based system which emphasizes the linkage of pay to economic 
performance after the establishment of stock exchanges in the early 1990s. This had increased 
the amount of attention CEOs give to the financial position of their companies. 
Since economic development is a significant objective of the government, economic performance 
should be positively related to the likelihood of a CEO receiving political promotion, the 
researchers hypothesised. 
They conjectured that the extent to which government focused on economic achievements in 
determining political assignments, the greater the motivation for CEOs to maximise firm value. 
The researchers analysed the CEO compensation data of 756 SOEs listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2005 (when these data began to be disclosed) to 2009. They 
also tracked the career movement of the CEOs through annual reports, news and online 
searches. 
The data showed that 331 of the CEOs changed their jobs during the time period and the 
researchers traced the new job positions. Of these, 141 CEOs had a promotion out of which 104 
was a political promotion. 
In their study, the researchers defined a political promotion as the appointment of an officer of 
the central government, local government, or the military; a member of the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and the 
Secretary of the Communist Party Committee in the firm or parent company. 
The researchers noted: “The relative rarity of non-politically related promotion is consistent with 
limited outside opportunities that CEOs face in the managerial labor market in China.” 
The statistics revealed that the mean return on assets and return on sales of the SOEs led by 
those who had a political promotion was 4.27 per cent and 6.04 per cent respectively. 
In contrast, the mean values return on assets and return on sales of the SOEs led by those who 
did not have any promotion was 1.24 per cent and 2.76 per cent respectively. 
“These results suggest that political promotion is at least partially based on economic 
performance,” said the researchers. 
At the same time, these better performing CEOs had a lower pay. Their mean pay is 395,513 
RMB (62,750 USD) — much lesser than the 449,135 RMB (71,260 USD) collected by the CEOs 
who did not receive any promotion. 
Motivating the CEO 
These findings – the first of its kind in offering empirical evidence – indicates that both explicit 
(compensation-based) and implicit (political-based) incentives are effective in shaping 
managerial behaviour, the researchers noted. 
It “fills a void” in understanding China’s significant growth in state-related sectors by showing how 
alternative mechanisms based on political incentives can provide executives with sufficient 
motivation in an institutional environment with weak corporate governance, and ultimately 
enhance the performance of the state economy. 
Because of the massive size and the advantages that they enjoy, SOEs are often viewed as 
highly inefficient. However, the finding that CEOs are also focused on making profits show that 
the 'inefficiency' perception is “not necessarily so”. Cao noted that “SOEs with capable CEOs 
with political ambitions seem to play a pivotal role in fuelling Chinese growth”. 
One policy implication of the findings is that full privatisation does not necessarily have to be the 
only solution to SOEs going forward in the global economy. “While CEO pay is often not 
competitive in SOEs compared to private companies, government is smart to use political benefit 
as another way to incentivize top managers,” he said. 
So when political career concerns provide an incentive for CEOs to improve firm performance, 
minority shareholders may benefit for they often have limited influence over management of the 
CEOs from SOEs. "In contrast, many SOEs can destroy value for small investors who naively 
believe their investment of SOEs can yield good returns," Cao concluded. 
 
